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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to examine the success of cross-border mergers
and acquisitions from a cultural standpoint. The study was focused on a theoretical
perspectives and research findings on a cross-border merger and acquisitions,
cultural influences on the deal and cultural integration in a post-deal stage. Finally,
the case from the business world was introduced in order to analyse how
theoretical background of the subject apply.
The study examined secondary data. Secondary data was gathered from literature
focused on mergers and acquisitions, cultures and organisations and cross-
cultural management to indicate major findings, and most importantly, identify
gaps in the literature that need to be addressed.
The result of the study indicated that identification and evaluation of cultural
aspects of potential partners and targets are of a high importance, on the national
and corporate culture level, revealing that post-deal integration is a major
challenge in most cross-border merger and acquisition transactions. Cultural
evaluation is best accomplished by carrying out cultural due diligence. Post-deal
cultural integration of the partner or the target company is discovered to be
essential for further growth and therefore comprehend the potential value of the
investment.
Key words: cross-border mergers and acquisitions, M&A deals, post-deal cultural
integration, national culture, corporate culture, cultural due diligence
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EXPLENATION OF TERMS AND ABBREVATIONS
Confidentiality agreement - Formal agreement under which a prospective buyer,
investor, or lender undertakes to keep all oral or documented-information as
strictly confidential, and to return the confidential documents upon request
Due diligence - Measure of prudence, responsibility, and diligence that is expected
from, and ordinarily exercised by a reasonable and prudent person under the
circumstances
Letter of intent - Interim agreement that summarizes the main points of a proposed
deal, or confirms that a certain course of action is going to be taken
Net present value - Difference between the present value (PV) of the future cash
flows from an investment and the amount of investment
No-shop agreement - The target company involved in merger or acquisition agrees
not to consider other offers while negotiating with a particular bidder
Synergy - State in which two or more agents, entities, factors, processes,
substances, or systems work together in a particularly fruitful way that produces an
effect greater the sum of their individual effects
Value chain - Interlinked value-adding activities that convert inputs into outputs
that, in turn, add to the bottom line and help create competitive advantage
NPV - Net Present Value
M&A - Merger and Acquisition
PwC - PricewaterhouseCoopers
11 INTRODUCTION
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have appeared as an important tool for growth
and success of the world’s companies, especially in the last years. In cross-border
activities businesses deal with cross-cultural differences and complexity of
different financial structures that play the key part in success of an international
M&A deal.
The past years are showing record figures in M&A activates worldwide, and in
2006, figures showed for the first time in this field the annual value of the
transactions which was exceeding EUR€ 3 trillion. The cross-border activates
alone totalled to a record high of EUR€ 1 trillion. These figures show how
important and necessary M&A activities are for the transnational businesses. But
not all is as clear and successful as it seems. Even though last years’ figures show
an increase in international M&A activity, the percentage of failures in transactional
activities was in fact 83%.
Since the majority of cross-border M&A transactions fail, the main point of this
paper is focused on analysing why this failure figure is so high and it is examined
from the cultural perspective of international M&A performance. Carrying out the
research and analysing the problems of this subject shows that organisational
culture and culture in general (national culture) play a big but complicated role
which is difficult to manage in the cross-border M&A activities. Therefore, cultural
difficulties are one of the main reasons for cross-border M&A failures. The
importance of cultural difference awareness is showed in the case of Daimler-
Chrysler merger. The reader of this study will get a deeper insight to the subject of
culture and its importance when dealing with cross-border M&A transactions.
This paper covers what has been researched and analysed regarding the topic
and the issues of “What are merger & acquisition in general and cross-border
merger & acquisition issues and concerns?”, “What role does culture have in
cross-border M&A activities and post-deal integration?” and “What does post-deal
integration present and what is the best way to deal with it?”  in order to create the
perspective for the topic and concluding with possible solutions to the issue. The
theory part of this paper, therefore, is divided into two sections: (1) Mergers &
2acquisitions and cross-border merger & acquisitions, and (2) Culture in general,
organisational culture, cultural influences on M&A activities and post-deal cross-
border integration.
The purpose of this paper is to function as a pointer of direction when dealing with
international M&A in order to recognise possible cultural clashes, and reduce the
probability of failure. The information is based on the figures, statistics, and facts,
which are combined with opinion of relevant individuals, and with combination of
opinion from the author of this paper.
The paper is built in a chronological order. First part of the paper covers theory on
mergers and acquisitions, focusing on defining the importance of this kind of
transactions in the business world. It is followed by theory of culture, and how it
influences the M&A deals’ success. The third part focuses on the role of culture in
the merger and acquisition deals throughout implementation and cultural
integration in the post-deal stage. The forth part examines the crucial importance
of early evaluation of cultural differences by using a business case of the merger
of America Chrysler Corporation and German Daimler Benz. The last part of the
paper provides a recommendation for carrying out cultural due diligence for
effective accomplishment that evaluates cultures of involved companies in cross-
border M&A deal.
32 METHODOLOGY
This paper is based on secondary material. The material includes mainly
academic literature dealing with merger and acquisitions environment, cross-
border organisational management and textbooks exploring culture, in order to
bring up theoretical background of the subject. The research was realised during
autumn/winter 2008 and finalised in spring 2009, with author’s high interest to this
subject.
To find the literature relevant to the subject, author used different search tools
available (libraries, databases, the internet etc.). When searching, author used
keywords such as cross-border merger, cross-border acquisition, culture, national
culture, corporate culture, cultural impact, integration, and other corresponding
keywords related to the subject. Sources for material were found in reference lists
of suitable recent research reviews and articles (e.g. European Commission, 2007;
Lambrecht, 2005). Author is aware of the fact that the selection of sources can
affect the results of the study and therefore author used research articles and
findings, with their basis on primary data. Because of wide range of information
available, author had to narrow and evaluate the material by significance and
relation to the study to achieve quality result.
43 M&A – FOCUS TOWARDS CROSS-BORDER M&A
This part is investigating mergers and acquisitions (M&A) by its definition,
diversity, process, the reasons for dealing with M&A and history. It has a special
focus on the concerns and findings when dealing with the cross-border M&A.
3.1 M&A Overview
The subject of M&A is progressively more investigated in the literature in the
recent years as the activities in M&A are rising and the complexity of their
transactions increases (especially in the cross-border sense) (DePamphilis, 2008).
In order to set an M&A framework for this papers topic, the M&A activities are
explored in terms of their definitions and motives behind them.
3.2 Definition of M&A
Mergers and acquisitions, in the broad sense, can involve a number of diverse
transactions that are ranging from the purchase and sales of undertakings,
cooperation and joint ventures to the formation of companies, concentration
between undertakings, corporate success, insurance of the independence of
businesses, alliances, management buy-out and buy-in, change of legal forms,
initial public offerings and also restructuring. Changes in ownership of the
companies through M&A can have affect on national economies, regional
economies, industry structures, owners, creditors, advisers, management,
employees and other stakeholders (Angwin, 2007).
The definitions for M&A in order to understand what they actually stand for and
why these are important for the companies and the business world in general are
the following:
Merger: “A combination of two or more firms in which all but one legally cease to
exist.” (DePamphilis, 2008,p. 715).
Acquisition: “The purchase by one company of a controlling ownership interest in
another firm, a legal subsidiary of another firm, or selected assets of another firm.”
(DePamphilis, 2008, p. 703).
5Mergers are usually referred to as negotiated deals that meet certain technical and
legal requirements. These negotiations are usually between friendly parties that
have come to a mutually agreeable decision to combine their companies.
However, the negotiations can be different in practice where one of the firms in a
merger can be more dominant then the other during the transaction. This might
lead to the hostile negotiations although these where supposed to be friendly. On
the other hand, during some negotiations situation can be vice versa (Weston,
Mitchell and Mulherin, 2004).
In acquisitions, one company takes control over the ownership in another firm or
selected assets, for instance manufacturing faculty. These can be set in the forms
of share acquisitions and asset acquisitions. In a share acquisition, acquiring
company buys a certain amount of share of stocks in the target company with the
goal to influence targeted company’s management. As for an asset acquisition, it
is when an acquiring company purchases all or a part of the targeted company
assets, and after the transaction the target remains as a legal entity (Weston et al,
2004).
Merger and acquisition are therefore two distinct transactions with different
consequences regarding economic liability, legal perspectives and acquisition
procedures.
3.3 The diversity of M&A
The M&A transactions from the economic perspective can be categorised into
horizontal, vertical or conglomerate. A horizontal M&A involves the acquiring and
the target company that are rivals in the same industry. Because of the
technological changes and economic liberalisation in resent decade, horizontal
M&A has developed significantly (such as automobile and pharmaceutical
industries). Vertical M&A categorised as combinations of firms in different stages
of production. The reasons why firms engage in this kind of transaction are
reducing costs and mainly reducing uncertainty through upstream and
downstream linkages in the value chain (Weston et al (2004)). As for
conglomerate M&A transactions, it is when the acquiring and the target company
6are in unrelated types of business activity. An example for this category of
transaction is for instance merger of Royal Dutch Petroleum of the Netherlands
with Shell Transport & Trading of the UK, which was valued at $80.1 billion
(Institute of Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances (MANDA), 2009).
In addition, M&A transactions can be either domestic or cross-border
(DePamphilis, 2008). This is considered by where the parties involved are based
and where they operate. In domestic M&A transactions, parties involved are from
one country and operate in that economy-country. A cross-border M&A transaction
entails parties that are situated in different countries, or parties that are operating
within one economy but are belonging to different countries.
3.4 The Process of Merger & Acquisition
In the literature the M&A process is described as a model that goes through three
phases: planning, implementation (execution) and post-M&A integration (Boeh and
Beamish, 2007).
It is described that the planning phase consists of choosing the best possible
strategy to assist in coordination and emphasising the deal to develop the overall
plan for the transaction. Planning covers the analysis i.e. due diligence process,
inspection, reflection and various approvals in all operational, managerial and legal
techniques with further observation towards the two following phases.
The implementation or execution phase can only be pursued after board of
directors approves planning phase and it covers a range of different activities (or
checkpoints), events and action. These activities include the signing of
confidentiality agreements, letter of intent, possible other types of agreements
(e.g. no-shop agreement), and finally it is concluded with an M&A contract and
deal closure.
The third phase is known as post- M&A integration. Post- M&A integration should
already be overviewed during the planning phase and it includes direct activities of
implementation of different mechanisms for monitoring control, implementation of
plans for ongoing communication and post-implementation cultural assessment.
7According to authors Boeh et al (2007), management teams need to decide after
deal is closed using “when” and “how” framework, what is the best tactical choice
in achieving deal’s objectives.
The following figure shows this framework (Boeh and Behamish, 2007, p. 272):
Figure 1: Postmerger Integration: When and How
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83.5 The reasons behind choosing M&A as a way of transaction
The literature on M&A has placed a significant amount of efforts on exploring the
motives of firms engaging in M&A transactions. Author Trautwein (1990) has listed
a systematic summary of the motives, with a mark on the different theories
(referring to table: Motives of M&A).
Trautwein (1990) has pointed out that M&A dealers regularly name synergy and
valuation (a positive net present value (NPV) on a deal) as objectives to justify
their actions under the motives suggested in various theories. In the text are no
claims, which indicate the motives that are to achieve monopoly power or
examples where managers refer their own benefits to justify an M&A deal. In
addition to this, Trautwein (1990) indicates that there is little evidence available in
both practice and research in regards to the motives contained by “the raider” and
“the process” theories. He examines the “disturbance theory” to some extend that
is considered at the macro-economic level (theories explanation are in the table 1:
Motives of M&A, p. 9).
Authors Griffiths and Wall (2007) analyse M&A motives in a more practical way by
referring to theories with various supporting empirical case studies as evidence
and examples. According to these authors, there are many motives, from which
they explained followed as particularly important to this subject:
- Under M&A it is considered for companies to grow quickly which works as
an indicator;
- As a result of M&A bigger companies may have a better approach to capital
market that might later lead to a lower cost of capital;
- Companies hope to experience gains from economies of scale or scope as
a result
- When applying their superior management skills towards the target’s
business, companies hope to achieve anticipated gains by aim of M&A.
All of the authors agree that there is a range of complex motives that really differ
from deal to deal. They also agree on the fact that these motives cannot be
completely justified by any single theory or any single approach.
9TABLE 1: Motives of M&A  (adapted from Trautwein, 1990 and Häkkinen, 2005)
Motive Theory About the Theory
Net gains through
synergy
Efficiency theory Planning and executing M&A
deal in order to achieve
synergies of three different
types: financial, operational and
managerial.
Wealth
transfers from
customers
Monopoly
theory
Planning and executing M&A in
order to achieve market power.
Horizontal M&A may allow firms
to cross-subsidize products.
This can also at the same time
limit competition in more than
one market and therefore
prevents potential entrants. The
result is a higher market power.
Wealth
transfers from
target's
shareholders
Raider theory This theory applies when the
bidder in a deal situation causes
wealth transfer from the
shareholders of the object of the
company he bids (after a
successful takeover).
Beneficiary -
M&A
shareholders
from bidder
side
Net gains
through private
information
Valuation
theory
Planning and executing M&A
deal by manager that possesses
better information about the
target's value than what stock
market does.
M&A  -
rational
choice
Beneficiary - M&A managers Empire-building
theory
(Managerial
theory)
Managers planning and
executing M&A deal for their
own interests (maximising own
benefits) instead of
shareholders' value.
M&A as process outcome Process theory Processes, which are influenced
from organizational routines,
political games played between
an organization's sub-units and
outsiders, and individuals'
limited information processing
capabilities, are ruling M&A
decisions outcome.
M&A as macroeconomic
phenomenon
Disturbance
theory
Economic disturbances cause
M&A waves – they cause
changes in individual
expectations and increase the
general level of uncertainty. It is
therefore changing the
ordering of individual
expectations. By the cause of
this previous non-owners of
assets now place a higher value
on these assets than their
owners and vice versa. In the
end it results an M&A wave.
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3.6 The waves of M&A
The M&A form has been known already for a long period of time. The first
appearances of M&A date back to the end of the 19th century. From that time, the
M&A activity has occurred in cyclic waves that are appearing due to strategic
motivations that radically differ (DePamphilis, 2008). In the table bellow are
represented five waves with the timeline of development of M&A and clarification
of strategic motivations.
TABLE 2: Historical M&A waves (adapted from DePamphilis, 2008, p. 27)
Wave Period M&A Type and main drivers
1st 1897 - 1904
Predominantly horizontal types of M&A. Caused a surge
in industrial stocks and resulted in the creation of
monopolies.
2nd 1916 - 1929
Horizontal and vertical types of M&A. The antitrust law of
the 1920s has lowered the amount of horizontal
acquisitions. It resulted in more oligopolies and vertical
integration, but fewer monopolies.
3rd 1965 - 1969 Conglomerate types of M&A. Empire building andbenefiting from managerial synergies.
4th 1981 - 1989
M&A types in forms of divestitures, bargain-seeking
acquisitions, hostile takeovers. Main drivers e.g.
consolidation, specialisation, globalisation,
deregulations, and restructuring.
5th 1993 - 2001
Related types of M&A. Benefits from coordinating
resources and responding to e.g. globalisation,
increased importance of knowledge-based resources
and increasing shareholders value.
Currently M&A is experiencing its sixth wave that began in 2003. This wave has as
one of the main features the rise of global companies pursuing in cross-border
M&A deals with more focus on strategic fit and attention to post-deal integration
issues (Moeller and Brady, 2007). During the fifth wave, there was a number of
11
significant deals in different industries, for instance, Hewlett Packard/Compaq in
information technology, Exxon/Mobil in oil and petroleum, Daimler Benz/Chrysler
in automotive, Mannesmann/Vodafone in telecommunications.
TABLE 3: The top 10 largest deals since 2000 (Institute of Mergers, Acquisitions
and Alliances - MANDA, (2009))
3.7 Cross-Border M&A findings & concerns
In many countries international M&A is encouraged as a way of stimulating and
restructuring the aspects of the economy. Cross-border M&A stand for the most
common mean of use where international corporations take on foreign direct
investment, although the majority of these transactions usually fail. The proof of
these failures stands in an example of a study that is based on a sample of 4,430
acquisitions. In this study it is showed that international acquisitions by US firms
are categorised by significantly lower performance (based on stock returns and
operating performance) in comparison to US-domestic transactions. In the
analysis on M&A done by KPMG (1999), the findings reflect the result in which is
revealed that 83 % of the exampled international acquisitions failed to create
shareholder value. Hence, this means that only 17 % were successful (KPMG
(1999)).
When compared to domestic acquisitions, cross-border mergers and acquisitions
are believed to involve more obstacles and problems and are therefore less likely
to be successful (Angwin, 2007). Mergers and acquisitions in a cross-borders
Rank Year Acquirer Target
Transaction
Value
(in Mil. USD)
1 2000 Merger: America Online Inc. (AOL) Time Warner 164,747
2 2000 Glaxo Wellcome Plc. SmithKline Beecham Plc. 75,961
3 2004 Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. Shell Transport & Trading Co. 74,559
4 2006 AT&T Inc. BellSouth Corporation 72,671
5 2001 Comcast Corporation AT&T Broadband & Internet 72,041
6 2004 Sanofi-Synthelabo SA Aventis SA 60,243
7 2000 Spin-off: Nortel Networks Corporation 59,974
8 2002 Pfizer Inc. Pharmacia Corporation 59,515
9 2004 Merger: JP Morgan Chase & Co. Bank One Corporation 58,761
10 2006 Pending: E.on AG Endesa SA 56,266
Total 754,738
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sense continue to be very popular and still remain the main activity through which
transnational businesses undertake foreign direct investment, despite the fact that
business practices and researches show that majority of these activities fail,
especially in achieving pre-acquisition objectives. Because of these outcomes, it is
important to look at the causes of international merger and acquisition failure, and
to develop ideas and approaches that may reduce these problems. This is done
later in this paper.
Some factors that are influencing the growth of cross-border M&A are already
mentioned earlier, and these factors include the worldwide industry consolidation
and privatisation, and the liberalization of economies. The activities of cross-
border M&A are in a wider prospect similar to those of domestic M&A. But
because of their international nature, cross-border M&A also absorb different types
of challenges since countries have different economical, institutional, and cultural
structure. Hence, differences in national culture, preferences of the customers,
business practices, and also institutional forces (for e.g. government regulations),
can prevent companies from fully realising their strategic goals and purpose.
In addition, it is important for companies to make a revision of cultural audit of the
future partner in M&A deal before making any decisions and signing any contracts
as this is one of the crucial effects on a success of a deal. With this revision,
companies can achieve wider prospective on the cultural distance between them
and the partner company. In terms of organisational behaviour, cultural distance is
defined as follows: “the greater the difference in home versus host country culture,
the greater the potential difficulties” (Schneider and Barsoux, 2003, p. 140).
It is also significant to understand that the cultural distance and cultural differences
do not automatically mean a difficulty, as long as colliding cultures have their
complementary sides. For that reason, raising awareness of this issue through this
kind of due diligence - known as cultural due diligence - gives a big advantage
when integration process occurs. Cultural due diligence is a systematic method
that formulates rapid, cost-effective evaluations of the cultures of both sides in
M&A (Rankine, Stedman & Bomer, 2003). Cultural due diligence is still a missing
link in M&A activity, although legal and financial due diligence are significantly
used and studied.
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Still the main fact is that companies dealing with cross-border M&A want to access
new and rewarding markets. This would include the expansion of companies’
current goods to the wider markets. As a positive note of cross-border M&A,
companies headquartered in other countries represent a very good opportunity for
the company expanding to learn something new and gain new capabilities. As a
negative note, unclear information and uncertainty in foreign markets can create a
difficulty for companies to learn and adjust to both the local market and target
company.
When dealing with cross-border M&A, companies take into consideration diverse
circumstances on country-, industry-, and company-level, and aspects that relate
both to the acquiring and to the target company. On a country level and the
industry level, aspects such as natural resource availability, capital and labour,
and additionally, institutional aspects such as cultural, legal and political, are highly
important. On a company level, when pursuing an internationalisation strategy it is
necessary to identify and evaluate potential targets to acquire in the host
countries. When completing an acquisition or a merger, companies generally must
integrate the target company into their operations to realize the potential value of
their investment.
14
4 The Cultural Influences on M&A Activities
This part of the theory focuses on the cultural part of M&A, the definition of culture,
the meanings of national and corporate culture. It also focuses on the cultural
integration in cross-border M&A deals, and identifying cultural differences when it
comes to managing cultural integration.
4.1 The overview of culture as a part of M&A
In the M&A concept, cultural incompatibility can be the single largest cause when
something goes wrong with the cultural integration i.e. planned performance, the
departure of key executives, and also with the conflicts in the consolidation of
business that can be time-consuming (Angwin, 2007). Therefore, culture plays an
important part in how employees react to the new companies culture environment
and overall integration.
Before continuing further it is important to simplify some terms and concepts used
in this following part. As earlier proven, mergers and acquisitions are legally
different transactions. Merger is seen as a more friendly way of combining two
companies, but the combination can only in some cases be treated as one of
equals. The future performance of the combined companies is the result of the
integration. This can be either a failure or a success. To achieve a successful
combination it should, at least in the long run, add value to the shareholders. In
this part the author will look at whether or not combinations of cultures can achieve
successful results and what post-merger integration issues can occur.
To understand the idea of successful combination in cross-border M&A, it is
important to remember that a cultural combination is not always measured directly
in financial context. The success can also be measured in terms of reduced
employee resistance, more efficient integration and so on. The definition of
success or enhanced performance is discussed in different ways by many authors
and author will use the word integration in order to address the process where
combining companies (organisations) come together to form a new entity.
Post-merger integration can be a very challenging stage for companies when
dealing with cross-border M&A. If post-merger integration is not planned
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accordantly, companies are going to deal with additional costs, slower growth,
miss out possible profits and postpone or reduce loan payments. On the other
hand, if post-merger integration is properly planned, it can increase and enhance
the opportunities the value of the cross-border deal (PwC M&A Integration Survey
Report, 2008). Even though integration concept can include all aspects of a
company’s operations, author will use the word integration to describe mainly the
cultural integration. In addition, to clarify the concepts of organisational culture and
corporate culture, author intend to use them synonymously and will from this point
use the word corporate culture.
4.1.1 The definition of culture
The concept of culture in M&A has two dimensions that are in a relationship with
one another: national and corporate culture.
From the day we are born, we are taught of what is considered to be right or
wrong, ugly or beautiful, moral or immoral and the list goes on. This type of
knowledge is shaping the way we behave and therefore develops a pattern of
beliefs and values that contribute in daily decisions we make and everything we
do. When a certain pattern is established, it is then difficult to change it and it is
also learn something that is contradicting to this pattern. This is in a general sense
known as culture and it is often described as “collective programming of the
human mind that distinguishes the members of one human group from those of
another” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 2).
Culture is manifested by different rituals, like activities which are seen important,
but not crucial in achieving a desired result. It is visible through different symbols
(letters, words, objects or pictures) and heroes (people that are demonstrated as
model for behaviour - existing or non-existing). Due to this, it is not only
manifested by individuals’ own thoughts and values. These manifestations are the
cultural meaning and are only apparent to the members of that culture, but to an
outside viewer are visible as practices as well. In addition, culture is not something
that is inherited, but rather something that is taught in a social environment
(Hofstede, 2001). This is shown in the following figure:
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FIGURE 2: The ”Onion Diagram”: Manifestations of Culture at Different Levels of
Depth (Hofstede, 2001, p.11)
4.1.2 National Culture
Culture stands for an imperfectly shared system of interrelated understanding,
which is influenced and formed by its members (by history and by experience).
Even though individuals are not often aware of their own culture, it still affects
almost every aspect of the way people of a group interact with one another or with
an external stimulus.
Since the majority of management theories were developed in the Western
hemisphere, it is often assumed that they are universally applicable. But, a set of
common experience, themes and institutions that members of a nation face,
shapes their value orientations. This results in a unique national character, which
is then more noticeable to foreigners than to the nationals themselves and differ
widely from country to country (Hofstede, 1994).
G. Hofstede and G.J. Hofstede (2005) have conceded the following: others
believes that the main grounds for differences in thinking, feeling and acting
Symbols
Heroes
Rituals
Values Practices
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between countries is in differences in national institutions (such as governments,
laws, religious communities, school systems, family structures), while others point
out that institutions cannot be understood without considering culture, and that
understanding culture assumes insight into institutions. Therefore, it is impossible
to change the way people in a country act, think and feel by simply importing the
institutions from a foreign country.
To achieve successful combination in an M&A deal, it is important for multinational
companies to understand how national differences influence headquarter-
subsidiary relationships, as different cultures prefer different rules of conduct or
administrative procedures. For that reason, mainly in acquisition activities, it is
essential for the acquiring company to understand the national culture of its
acquiring target. This initiative will be helpful when post-acquisition stage takes
place, during which the acquiring company is about to integrate their management
system as well as corporate culture.
In order to describe the key differences in national culture, Hofstede (2001) has
developed five dimensions of culture. The five dimensions are used in his survey
that shows the differences of more than 50 national cultures. Other researchers,
who are measuring distance and evaluating relationships between different
national cultures, also regularly use these dimensions. They are also used in
numerous studies measuring cultural distance in M&A. The following table shows
these five dimensions:
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TABLE 4: 5 dimensions of culture (adapted Hofstede, (2001) & webpage (2009))
Value Dimension Value Description High Score Low Score
Power Distance
Index (PDI)
The degree of
equality, or inequality,
between people in the
country's society
Indicates that inequalities of
power and wealth have been
allowed to grow within the
society. These societies are
more likely to follow a caste
system that does not allow
significant upward mobility of
its citizens
Indicates the society de-
emphasizes the
differences between
citizen's power and
wealth. In these
societies equality and
opportunity for everyone
is stressed
Individualism
(IDV)
Degree to which a
society reinforces
individual or collective
achievement and
interpersonal
relationships
Indicates that individuality
and individual rights are
paramount within the
society. Individuals may tend
to form a larger number of
looser relationships
Typifies societies of a
more collectivist nature
with close ties between
individuals. Reinforce
extended families and
collectives where
everyone takes
responsibility for fellow
members of their group
Masculinity
(MAS)
Degree to which a
society reinforces, or
does not reinforce, the
traditional masculine
work role model of
male achievement,
control, and power
Indicates the country
experiences a high degree
of gender differentiation.
Males dominate a significant
portion of the society and
power structure, with
females being controlled by
male domination
Indicates the country
has a low level of
differentiation and
discrimination between
genders. Females are
treated equally to males
in all aspects of the
society
Uncertainty
Avoidance Index
(UAI)
Level of tolerance for
uncertainty and
ambiguity. within the
society - i.e.
unstructured
situations
Indicates the country has a
low tolerance for uncertainty
and ambiguity Creates a
rule-oriented society that
institutes laws, rules,
regulations, and controls in
order to reduce the amount
of uncertainty
Indicates that the
country has less
concern about ambiguity
and uncertainty and has
more tolerance for a
variety of opinions. It
reflects in a society as
less rule-oriented, more
readily to accepts
change.
Long-Term
Orientation (LTO)
Degree to which a
society embraces, or
does not embrace,
long-term devotion to
traditional, forward
thinking values
Indicates the country
prescribes to the values of
long-term commitments and
respect for tradition. This is
thought to support a strong
work ethic where long-term
rewards are expected as a
result of today's hard work.
However, business may take
longer to develop in this
society, particularly for an
"outsider"
Indicates the country
does not reinforce the
concept of long-term,
traditional orientation. In
this culture, change can
occur more rapidly as
long-term traditions and
commitments do not
become impediments to
change
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4.1.3 Corporate Culture
Corporate culture has been used as an independent variable to explain differences
in management styles and organisational practices, but also to some extend
explain the success of some organisations. The general concept of culture can
also be applied to companies and organisations.
There are almost as many descriptions and definitions of corporate culture as
there are researchers on that subject. To provide a brief theoretical foundation for
corporate culture, author Schein (2004) has presented the concept of corporate
culture in the way that he is being quite often referred to by others when
addressing culture in M&A contexts. Here are some of the examples that Schein is
referred to: Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner (2005), Angwin (2007), Holden
(2002), Soedberg & Vaara (2003).  Definitely
Schein (2004) has presented corporate culture from the standpoint of the
observer. He has divided the events into three different levels and they are
distinguished by the degree of visibility for the observer. The most visible for the
observer are the artifacts (facts that are received when coming across a new
culture such as technology and products, clothing etc.). Corporate strategies,
goals and philosophies are openly announced and are therefore visible, but these
do not automatically correspond to the actions themselves. Hence, in order to
achieve deeper understanding how espoused values are connected to the
behaviour at the artifactual level, it is important to take the least visible category
into consideration. The least visible category is the basic assumptions that are the
unconscious beliefs, which are taken for granted. In addition to this are also
thoughts and feelings that underlie how the group acts. Therefore, the ultimate
power of the culture positions here, as it is difficult to change these assumptions.
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The following figure illustrates how these levels relate to the degree of visibility.
FIGURE 3:  3 Levels of Organisational Culture (Schein, 2004, p. 26)
In a broad sense, corporate culture can be characterised as a company’s shared
values, business traditions, trading principles, philosophies and ways of operating
in the working environment that are very much guided by the members of the
organization.
Looking at the relationship with national culture when building culture of a
company, the different influences should not be underestimated. Companies have
policies and procedures, which are extremely important in order to manage human
resources in the company. Because of this, the corporate culture of a company
needs to effectively match these policies and procedures plus the strategies of the
company.
Three Levels of Organisational Culture
Artifacts
Espoused Beliefs &
Values
Basic
Underlying
Visual organisational
structures and processes
(hard to decipher)
Strategies, goals, philosophies
(espoused justifications)
Unconscious, taken for granted
beliefs, perceptions, thoughts and
feelings (ultimate source of values
and action)
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Hofstede (2001) points out that since culture has a historical basis and is socially
constructed, it can be described as a product of successful adaptation to the
environment. If there is going to be a change that might occur due to M&A or a
change in a company’s strategy, there will be resistance to it. This means that
during an M&A deal when companies try to modify another’s corporate culture,
they may face difficulties on the way. If these difficulties are not successfully
overcome, M&A often fails as a result of managers underestimating the
importance of the people factor and cultural fitness.
4.2 Cultural Integration in Cross-border M&A deals
Companies have different corporate cultures, values, operating styles and
philosophies due to different external environments and different backgrounds.
When cross-border M&A deal occurs, the primary task of the company becomes
the integration of the recourses and operations. The integration process is highly
critical stage for the success of M&A deal.
As earlier mentioned, cultural differences in cross-border M&A deals are not only
narrowed to the company level, but can also happen on a national level. The
difference can arise from differences in countries, nationalities, or companies.
These differences can help companies expand their development if approached
properly. The cultural integration in M&A deals can eliminate conflicts that mainly
arise from cultural differences by classifying and merging the values and by
merging modes of behaviour and other forms i.e. machinery units (Harward
Business Review, 2001).
By using cross-border M&A cultural integration companies seek to reduce cultural
differences as much as possible in the acquired company. Hence, no matter if the
cultural integration is successful or not, it is certain that it is essential to the
success or failure of a cross-border M&A. Normally, the following arising issues
should be taken under consideration in cultural integration of cross-border M&A:
1) Coordination of cultural differences of country and people to promote
understanding, which includes: communicating (between different
groups/departments in companies) and avoidance of the negative
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influences that arise from the dissimilar values, thinking models and
behaviours.
2) Coordination of the different corporate cultures in order to eliminate the
following barriers: leadership styles, personnel systems, communication
models, performance appraisals, and social security benefits.
3) Establishment of the company’s core values. This should happen by
integrating diverse cultures in order to improve company’s competitiveness
and creativity and thus achieve competitive advantage.
4) Integration of the companies’ cultural effectiveness. This can create an
environment that is beneficial for the integration of operations.
This also indicates that cultural integration of cross-border M&A has an important
function in maximising capital and sales, improving operational techniques and
forming other advantages. Integration challenges are influenced by the corporate
cultural differences between the companies as well by the differences of their
national cultures (Angwin, 2007).
Corporations are unavoidably influenced by the culture of the country that they are
situated in. Cross-border M&A transaction build up a situation of cultural diversity
where the developing and carrying out the cultural process of integration is highly
important. In other words, the culture of multinational company becomes more
complex since different cultures collide and merge with each other and it does not
only depend upon the culture of one country. Hence, it is necessary for the
companies that deal with an M&A transaction to carry out cross-cultural process to
integrate effectively the cultural differences and their resources.
The cultural integration of a cross-border M&A deal is a process that coordinates
cultural diversity and creates harmonisation within a company. Nevertheless,
cultural integration is a complex process that forms a new model of corporate
culture within a company by selecting, absorbing, and integrating cultures. Cultural
integration in cross-border M&A deals with larger cultural and organisational
differences can provide more opportunities, but also additional challenges in
realising these opportunities. Therefore, companies involved within a new culture
should find an integration mode that it is suitable for both sides of the deal, and not
only aim to transfer its culture to the merged or its acquired company. Cross-
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cultural management is the most effective way of carrying out a successful cross-
border M&A.
4.3 Managing the process of post-deal cultural integration and identifying
cultural differences
Managing cross-cultural integration of M&A transactions by choosing suitable
model of cross-culture management can overcome possible conflicts and
unwanted influences in a post-merger process. This can also help companies to
achieve results such as converting the negative situations into positive ones, and
achieve power of the cultural synergy (Picot, 2002).
The basic steps of cross-cultural management in post-merger integration are in
understanding and respecting the other cultures, stressing the importance of
communication, and generating adaptive changes. As earlier showed, culture
reflects throughout people’s behaviour and way of thinking. For companies to gain
valuable ability to adapt to the new environment, it is necessary for the
management to actively be involved in learning process of the culture of others.
This will give a different insight into problem-solving and decision-making
perspectives and will increase flexibility between management styles for its
employees across borders.
In the cross-border M&A deals, management plays a major role when it comes to
the cultural integration. The clashes of the differences of the management styles in
M&A deals can be the biggest reason of the deal failure. Differences of the
management styles are again mainly influenced by a corporate culture. Already
analysed in terms of national culture dimensions, companies are different in
management cultures, have different preferred ways of running their business over
time, which are based on members’ shared history and experiences.
Cultural integration needs to be planned before the post-deal process starts to
prevent possible setbacks. The situation where management assumes that they
already have an understating of the cultural differences between their companies
and prospective partners, mainly if their businesses operate in the same industry
easily can turn out to a concern. The issues regarding insufficiently planned
integration can also occur during companies’ inner conflicts. This proves that only
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superficial analyses are not enough to carry out cultural integration (PwC M&A
Integration Survey Report, 2008). Therefore, in the planning phase of a cross-
border M&A deal, identifying and analysing the values, artifacts and assumptions
of companies, will provide them with important findings to evaluate the cultural gap
between them. This will support post-deal integration towards well-coordinated
focus towards success.
Going into more details, managers, negotiators or employees are not the only
ones who are affected by cultural differences. Affected are also divisions that stay
in their home company who experience contacts with foreigners when using up-to-
date communication and information technology e.g. teleconferencing,
videoconferencing etc. This indicates that mutual cooperation between parties is
important in order to achieve successful integration. Communication is highly
required when cooperating. To achieve successful communication as a part of a
cross-border M&A integration, it is important to identify cultural differences and
deal with them accordingly. Authors Schneider and Barsoux (2003) have identified
three different strategies to do so. They have identified the following when
managing cultural difference: ignoring, minimising or utilising.
Schneider et al (2003) introduce ignoring cultural difference as “operating on the
assumption that business is business” and that “managers, engineers, or bankers
are the same throughout the world” (Schneider (et al. 2003), p. 256). By choosing
this strategy, companies assume to unite in management practice and
technological development (desire for modernisation).
The minimising strategy is the second strategy of impact of cultural differences. It
stands for “finding ways of homogenizing cultural differences, creating sameness,
or isolating them and creating segregation in order to reduce potential conflict”
(Schneider et al (2003), p. 259). In a more simple way, when companies choose
this strategy, they are aware of the cultural differences but intend to treat them as
the source of potential difficulties and conflict. This strategy can be performed in
several different ways. One of the ways is a strong corporate culture that is used
to serve as a tool to reduce the impact of the different national cultures. This can
be achieved by either creating global universal culture such as assigning senior
management from the main company culture to be responsible for the local
25
division, or by maintaining strong relations between employees, i.e., when sending
employees abroad to scan and train foreign workers. Cultural segregation,
isolating different cultures and thus avoiding clashes is another way of performing
this strategy. This way of performing can be done by giving the local company
their independence (giving control over decisions how to do things). In this sense,
the headquarters express what is expected to be done, where local division has
the power to decide how to do it. Creating regional headquarters is the third way of
minimising strategy. This way of action helps in improving coordination between
national organisations, and in reconciling between local conditions and global
strategic headquarters.
The third strategy for identifying cultural differences is utilising these differences.
Utilising differences strategy is done with introducing different kinds of matrix
structures. Company managers should be a part of developing global plans where
their field of influence should be enlarged. This could also include expansion of
their responsibility in coordinating and expansion of career opportunities beyond
their local operation (Schneider et al (2003), p. 266-271). With the strategy of
utilising cultural differences, in order to build the proper balance between
responsiveness to the local needs and main control centres, managers need to
have crucial competencies such as interpersonal skills or language competency.
All three strategies are summarised in the following table.
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TABLE 5: Strategies for managing cultural differences (Schneider and Barsoux
(2003), p. 255)
Ignore Minimise Utilise
An opportunity
Assumptions:
Culture as
irrelevant
A problem/threat
A source of
competitive
advantage
Headquarter/subsidiary
relationship:
Ethnocentric Polycentric/
regioncentric
Geocentric
Standardisation Localisation
Expected benefit:
Global
integration
Responsiveness
Innovation and
learning
Performance criteria: Efficiency Adaptability Synergy
Top-down
Communication:
Top-down
Bottom-up
reporting
All channels
Major challenge: Gainingacceptance
Achieving
coherence
Leveraging
differences
Inflexibility Fragmentation Confusion
Major concern: Missed
opportunities
Duplication of
effort and loss of
potential synergy
Fiction
Author Adler (1997) has a similar approach to this subject. Adler identifies three
strategies which are named as following: parochial, ethnocentric and synergy. All
of these approaches can be compared with Schneider and Barsoux’s (2003)
methods.
Parochial strategy is comparable with Schneider et al (2003) ignoring method,
ethnocentric strategy with minimising and synergistic with utilising. Parochial
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strategy means accepting only own way of approaching things as the only way
there is while choosing to ignore cultural diversity or its impacts on the
organisation. With ethnocentric strategy managers recognise cultural diversity that
is seen as source of problems, where doing things their own way is the best way
there is. The third strategy is the synergistic approach where cultural differences
are seen as leading to both advantages and disadvantages, where managers are
certain that it is possible to combine and create the best way of doing things,
taking elements from combined cultures in the organisation. A table summarising
Adler’s approach can be found in appendix 1.
When dealing with cultural differences it is very difficult to choose the right
strategy. The choice of strategy depends on goals, purpose and on situation of the
company. Companies and managers should be aware of the cultural differences in
order to achieve positive results and successful outcome.
When dealing with M&A transactions, the aspects of the process of cultural
integration should be already dealt with in the planning stage of the deal. This way
companies can increase the efficiency and the effectiveness of the cultural
integration and more easily overcome issues that can occur. Hence, in cross-
border M&A deals the buyer should respect the culture of the target company, and
try to understand the target’s culture. Companies should not use their gained
cultural values to judge the others culture, but should combine the company’s
strategic implications with its culture. After a cross-border M&A deal is set,
establishing a new culture is the combination of different cultures.
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5 Business Case – The Chrysler Corporation & Daimler-Benz merger
The background theory in the previous parts has shown the significance of M&A in
cross-border businesses and how culture and cultural differences play a big role in
the success of M&A. The attention is focused on the cultural integration and
managing this process in cross-border M&A deals, which proved to be one of the
crucial parts in the outcome of companies deal.
The following case from the business world, the merger of Chrysler Corporation
and Daimler-Benz, will provide more description and importance of culture and
cultural differences by applying the theory to practice.
The case is founded on already existing articles in Time (1999), L.A. Times (1999),
Darling, Seristö and Gabrielsson (2005) and ICFAI Canter for Management
Research (2003).
5.1 Case Background
On 6 May 1998, the agreement on merger between Chrysler Corporation and
Daimler-Benz AG was signed. This was then announced the following day to the
public as the merger of equals. This merger happened just a few months later after
Juergen Schrempp, Chairman of Germany-based Daimler-Benz, on 12 January
1998 suggested a merger to Robert Eaton, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman
of the American-based Chrysler Corporation (Time (1999)).
The name of the merged companies was agreed to be Daimler-Chrysler AG.
Daimler-Chrysler AG became the largest industrial merger at that time with $ 92
bn market value, annual turnover approximately at $ 130 bn and 421 000
employees worldwide. With this merger the company became the fifth largest car
producer in the world.
Some of the basic agreement terms were as following:
- The headquarters was dual, based in Michigan (USA) and incorporated in
Germany
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- Each partner of the Daimler-Chrysler AG had a voting power and newly
established Management Board had nine executives
- Daimler-Chrysler was co-chaired by the chairman of the Daimler Benz
management board, Juergen Schrempp and CEO of Chrysler Corporation,
Robert Eaton
- Shareholders Daimler-Benz were to own 58 % and shareholders of
Chrysler the remaining 42% of the new stock
- Daimler-Chrysler AG decided to use the current brands with the same
names as so far, which were: Mercedes-Benz, Chrysler, Jeep, Dodge,
Plymouth, Sterling, Freightliner and Setra
The CEOs were enthusiastic and positive about the future of the merger, and they
predicted several profits in financial sense; expectations in 1998 were at the post-
merger increase in sales predicted to reach 13 % with first- year cost cuts of $ 1.4
billion, rising to $ 3.5 billion in annual savings within two to three years (ICFAI
Canter for Management Research (2003)).
Chryslers’ reasons behind the merger was the expansion to the other markets and
financially strong partner. On the other hand Daimler-Banz was financially stable
and one of the largest companies in Germany. Daimler-Banz reasons behind the
merger were ensuring stable growth and stability in the future. Company needed
to extend its reach into other market segments and an outside partner to enter the
new markets.
With the exceptions of the staff functions in finance, purchasing, HR, and IT,
Chrysler Corporation and Daimler-Benz were to continue to run their main
business functions separately. CEOs R. Eaton and J. Schrempp were both proud
of the fact that the merger was so quickly implemented to the companies. After the
first year of combined operations, according to the letter that was send by Eaton
and Schrempp to the company’s shareholders, after the first year of the merger
revenues grew by 12 %, the operating profits by 38 %, the net income increased
by 30 %, 19,000 new labour positions were created, and over 4.4 mil vehicles
were sold (Time (1999)).
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At the same time the disagreements and conflicts between the partner companies
were growing. The two companies were separated by geography, tradition and
national culture before the merger. Both companies had their own strong historical
heritage and because of this both companies were deeply respected in their
nations, and both were very protective of their corporate identity. The companies
had very different corporate cultures, which were based on different national
cultures. As for example, Daimler-Chrysler workers in Germany used to take
several company-sanctioned brakes to go for a beer during working hours. In the
USA, this kind of practice would raise the noise of alcohol-related accidents and
legal liability. And still, Daimler-Chryslers’ chairman J. Schrempp had a bar
installed in his new office, so that he could enjoy his European working
environment, despite to the amazement of his American colleagues (Darling,
Seristö and Gabrielsson (2005)).
Another cultural conflicts related to the aspect of corporate cultures between
Germans and Americans, was that Germans embraced formality and hierarchy,
and well-structured decision-making unlike Americans who favoured free-form
discussions and casual names. In general, this proves that companies were very
different by their culture.
The result of this was that a number of top managers in USA left the company or
were fired from Chrysler; Chrysler’s executive vice president for manufacturing D.
Pawley, one of the most respected manufacturing executives in the auto industry
retired at the end of 1998; in the begging of 1999, two key vice presidents of
Chrysler moved to Ford Motor Company; Daimler-Chrysler’s vice president for
public affairs shifted to General Motors during 1999 and in September 1999,
Daimler-Chrysler’s North American president was fired. Company’s co-chairman
R. Eaton retired one year earlier than planned (March 2000) which left Schrempp
in sole control of Daimler-Chrysler (ICFAI Canter for Management Research
(2003)).
With a number of top executives, Chrysler also lost the reputation for creativity,
efficiency and profitability. During that time, it became clear that the merger of
equals was actually turned into German acquisition of an American company. After
Eaton’s retirement, Schrempp began replacing Chrysler’s top executives with
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German managers. First replacement happened to J. Holden who was Chrysler’s
second post-merger president. He was replaced with former Mercedes-Benz
executive D. Zetsche. After that, German engineer W. Bernhard filled in the
position of Chrysler’s chief operating officer (ICFAI Canter for Management
Research (2003)).
Financial performance of Chrysler had also dramatically dropped. During 2001, the
company lost hundreds of millions of dollars. Even more production shutdowns
were forecasted by the end of 2000, as the orders from dealers slowed down. The
new Chrysler’s president D. Zetsche had announced a restructuring plan, which
initially had predicted worker redundancies, production cutbacks, and other cost-
cutting processes. Still, the leaders did not try to identify the cause of the problems
that Chrysler was facing, neither before the merger, nor in the post- merger phase.
Nobody has paid attention to the cultural differences that were causing clashes
between the Germans and the Americans.
5.2 The Analysis
The merger happened very quickly, involving both sides of the deal. At the time,
this was the largest industrial merger in history with generally positive remarks and
matching effects on the financial markets. The agreement on merger of Daimler-
Benz and the Chrysler Corporation was originally deliberated as a corporate
merger of equals. International media and financial markets viewed this merger at
the beginning as a strong alliance and a very powerful business strategy move.
Everything was looking promising after the first year of post-merger operations
(e.g. revenues grew 12 %, 19,000 new jobs were created etc.).
The first outcomes and problems of unsuccessfully carried out post-merger
integration were starting to show as key executives, who were credited with
Chrysler’s success, were changing to different companies or retired because they
were no longer part of the new organisation. The unsuccessfully carried out post-
merger integration showed in a major miscommunication in the company, lack of
ability to overcome major cultural differences and mismanagement between
workers. Eaton’s retiring also left Schrempp as Chairman, and in sole control of
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Daimler-Chrysler that boosted Chrysler’s position towards shutdowns and major
post losses. This also increased doubt amongst shareholders.
The biggest errors, which were distributed by Daimler-Chrysler’s managers, were
that there was no cultural audit that needed to be conducted before to the merger
deal. It is analysed that the human factor was forgotten or ignored, as neither the
shareholders nor the employees were involved in the process.
On to the second point, during the pre-merger negotiation phase, Americans and
Germans were paying no attention to subtle cultural differences. As earlier in the
paper showed, those differences commonly appear and cause difficulty during the
integration process, if not investigated on time.  Therefore, the differences in
culture between American Chrysler and German Daimler were largely responsible
for post-merger long-term failure.
Operations and management of the new company were not successfully
integrated as ‘equals’ in the merger because of Americans’ and Germans’ different
ways of working and approaching. Americans’ way of working is more in comfort
with of challenging their managers or giving them advice. Germans, on the other
hand, practice more autocratic and top-down management techniques. Managers
are expected by their employees to provide them with certain instructions that they
follow without questioning or interfering (Adler, 1997).
Hence, Chrysler preferred a more relaxed, freewheeling style of management
style, while Daimler-Benz’s culture stressed a more formal and structured mode.
When merged, Chrysler’s employees became particularly dissatisfied with
Daimler’s efforts to take over the entire company and integrate their corporate
culture on the whole company. These planned synergies were never achieved and
instead, Daimler-Benz perceived Chrysler as a potential competition.
Nonetheless, the main result in this deal was that the merger of Chrysler
Corporation and Daimler-Benz was never really a merger of equals. This became
most apparent when Chrysler’s executives were starting to be replaced by the
German management with their local managers.
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Neither part of the merger paid much attention to the basic cross-cultural clashes,
which was a key role in causing Daimler-Chrysler to fall from highly valued
business venture to a company that still experiences consequences of this. While
analysing this case, it is easy to recognize that Daimler-Chrysler management did
not study enough previous business cases that are related to cultural clashes in
cross-border mergers. They also made a mistake by underestimating the role of
culture in the post-merger integration and stakeholder perspective, making
assumptions – same industry same corporate culture.
Before the deal actually happened, companies should have in the planning stage
of the merger carried out a detailed evaluation of the merging organizations’
cultural norms, beliefs, and values in order to evaluate their compatibility. This
would have prevented the failure of successfully integrating the two very strong but
different organisational cultures that were hoping to become partners in achieving
of the goals and objectives of a merged cross-cultural global corporation.
Companies should have worked on the issues of coordination of cultural
differences between cultural differences of Germans and Americans on a national
level, and differences between people in the companies. This should have
included communication between groups in order to promote understanding and
avoidance of the negative influences (arising from dissimilar values, thinking
models and behaviours).
Companies should have prior finalising the merger deal analysed and established
what a new company’s core values are and set an environment that is beneficial
for the integration of operations. Both Chrysler Corporation and Daimler-Benz AG
were supposed to coordinate their different corporate cultures before merging into
Daimler-Chrysler that would have overcome barriers they faced in the post-merger
faze i.e. leadership style differences.
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6 Recommendations - Proactive solution in preventing cultural conflicts
From the research on this subject, it occurs that internationalisation affects the
social structure changes and as new technology appears on a daily basis,
companies tend to enter cross-border M&A more often, which can be risky for the
business. Observing the case of Chrysler Corporation & Daimler-Benz showed
that two well-known brands can fail to merge if not successfully integrated. When
companies deal with cross-border M&A transactions in order to survive post- deal
integration and boost businesses growth, companies can analyse effectively both
organisational sides and recognise possible issues in an early stages of the deal
(deal planning stage) as a proactive solution in preventing cultural conflicts. The
following points should companies be focused on when carrying this analysis:
1) Initial planning
With the initial planning, company is recommended to determine the
objectives they want to achieve. In this stage it is recommended to prepare
their organisation for future steps by creating a team that will be responsible
for carrying out the cultural due diligence and creating a list of necessary
data. In the initial planning, company should identify its possible issues in
the organisation that could conflict with the other party and estimate what
information will be needed from the other party.
2) Cultural assessment of the organisations – evaluating cultural fitness
Before the cross-border M&A deal is going to take place, company that is
hoping to expand across borders by a merger (or in the other cases, one
company is going to acquire international company) it is recommended to
evaluate the compatibility of the two cultures emerging.  This will provide
the companies an insight if the cultures can be combined or in the other
words, how far are they from each other. Even though this is time
consuming, carefully studying and systematically analysing the cultural
features of the companies – national and corporate cultures – can turn out
to be of a great importance for the future of the deal and this way avoid
failure in business.
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3) Integration Plan
Integration plan should include all detailed steps of the integration of the two
cultures mainly reflecting to the key findings from cultural evaluating fit. Integration
plan is recommended to consist of full cultural assessment information that is
based on measurement of the integration progress and cultural implementation
elements i.e. communication between co-workers.
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7 Conclusion
Companies today want to achieve competitive advantage and expand to the
international markets more rapidly, and one of the expansion strategies is through
mergers and acquisitions. Companies see M&A as a quicker way to enter new
market and reach a foreign scope.
During the last years there have been numerous mergers and acquisitions of a
high value. But for some companies, this form of expansion did not bring the
wanted results. Researches show that up to 83 % of the deals fail in achieving
their objectives. This mainly has negative influence on the shareholder value and
companies reputation i.e. consumer trust, loosing potential partners, falling from
the list of most successful companies.
Some of the reasons of these failures are connected to the ignoring of cultural
differences and underestimation of corporate cultural issues between companies.
When dealing with M&A, each company must integrate successfully in order to
achieve positive results. Integration is done through the corporate cultures
between dealing companies and especially in cross-border transactions, where
different national cultures have an additional effect.
Dealing with a new partner or an acquired company, communication becomes
very a important tool and the choice of strategy to identify cultural differences
essential. There are quite a few strategies to identify cultural differences identified
by several authors. Schneider and Barsoux (2003) came up with ignoring,
minimising or utilising strategies, while Adler approached the subject with similar
strategies named: parochial, ethnocentric and synergy. The choice of the strategy
depends on company’s goals, purpose and situation.
The cultural integration and identification of cultural differences is a time
consuming process, where it is necessary to recognise the sources of possible
cultural clashes and learn to value the differences. This will help to understand
others’ culture and achieve successful integration in the new-formed company. To
be able to achieve this and be rewarded with a positive outcome, it is necessary to
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carry out cultural due diligence and before heading to the finalisation of the deal,
organise a sufficient integration plan.
The Chrysler Corporation & Daimler-Benz merger - case showed how it is
important to communicate with the employees, but more importantly to evaluate
cultural compatibility prior entering the M&A deal finalisation and integration.
Cultural difficulties occurred between formal and well-structured Daimler-Benz and
more flexible style of Chrysler.
In the Daimler-Chrysler case, the existence of cultural differences such as different
working styles, decision making and communication processes were ignored
which caused top executives on America’s side to leave the company.  That
further had an influence on losing the reputation of creativity, efficiency and
profitability of the company. The incompatibility of the two companies with two
different cultural aspects was recognised too late, and therefore it was very difficult
overcome them. At the end it was clear that this was no ‘merger of equals’ but one
company dominating over the other. This proved how important it is to consider
cultural differences and be aware of them before entering into the further
engagements especially in signing and finalising an M&A deal. The Daimler-
Chrysler case is a good example for future cross-border M&A deals in any industry
concerning the avoidance or underestimating the cultural integration.
To conclude this study, author makes a citation of the following statement:
“Why do deals continue to fall short in creating real value? They don’t have to. The
secret to success lies in the early planning and timely execution of integration
tasks.”(PwC M&A Integration Survey Report, 2008, p.2)
38
8 Bibliography
8.1 Books
Adler, Nancy J. (1997) International dimensions of organizational behaviour 3rd
ed. Cincinnati. South-Western College Publishing
Angwin, Duncan (2007) Mergers and acquisitions, Malden. Blackwell Publishing
Boeh, Kevin K. & Beamish, Paul W. (2007) Mergers and acquisitions: text and
cases Thousand Oaks. Sage
Carey, Dennis (2001) Harward Business Review On Mergers and Acquisitions
Boston. Harvard Business School Press
Cartwright, Jeff (1999) Cultural Transformation: nine factors for continuous
business improvement London. Prentice Hall
DePamphilis, Donald M. (2008) Mergers, acquisitions, and other restructuring
activities 4th ed. Burlington. Academic Press Elsevier
Griffiths, Alan & Wall, Stuart (2007) Applied Economics 11th ed. Essex. Pearson
Education
Hofstede, Geert  (2001) Culture’s consequences : comparing values, behaviors,
institutions, and organizations across nations Thousand Oaks. Sage
Hofstede, Geert  (1994) Cultures and organizations: software of the mind:
intercultural cooperation and its importance for survival London. Harper Collins
Publishers
Hofstede, Geert (1984) Culture's consequences: international differences in work-
related values 2nd ed. London. Sage
Hofstede, Jan G. (2005) Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind 2nd ed.
New York. McGraw-Hill Professional
39
Holden, Nigel J. (2002) Cross-cultural management: a knowledge management
perspective Essex. Prentice Hall
Häkkinen, Lotta (2005) Operations Integration and value creation in horizontal
cross-border acquisitions Tampere. Esa Print
Mclean, Gary N. (2006) Organisational development: principles, processes and
performance San Francisco. Berrett-Koehler Publisher Inc.
Mullins, Laurie J. (2002) Management and organisational behaviour 6th ed. Essex.
Prentice Hall
Moeller, Scott & Brady, Chris (2007) Intelligent M&A: navigating the mergers and
acquisitions minefield Chichester. Wiley cop.
Picot, Gerhard (2002) Handbook of international mergers and acquisitions:
preparation, implementation and integration New York. Palgrave Macmillan
Rankine, D., Stedman, G. & Bomer, M. (2003) Due Diligence: defensive steps to
successful business combinations London. Prentice Hall
Schein, Edgar H. (2004) Organizational culture and leadership 3rd ed. San
Francisco. John Wiley and Sons
Schneider, Susan C. & Barsoux, Jean-Louis (2003) Managing across cultures
Essex. Prentice-Hall
Soedberg, Anne-Marie & Vaara, Eero (2003) Merging across borders: people,
cultures and politics Copenhagen. Copenhagen Business Scholl Press
Trompenaars, Fons & Hampden-Turner, Charles (2004) Managing people across
cultures West Sussex. Capstone Publishing Ltd.
40
Weston,J. Fred, Mitchell, L. Mark & Mulherin, J. Harold (2004)  Takeovers,
restructuring and corporate governance 4th ed.  Upper Saddle River. Prentice Hall
8.2 Articles & Journals
Darling, J., Seristö, H. & Gabrielsson, M. (2005) Anatomy of crisis management: a
case focusing on a major cross-cultural clash within Daimler-Chrysler The Finnish
Journal of Business Economics. No. 3. p. 343-360
European Commission (2007) Mergers & Acquisition note Directorate E, Economic
Evaluation Service. No.4 p. 1-11
Gibney, Frank Jr. (1999) Worldwide Fender Blender  (Internet). “Time” article
available at: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,991030,00.html
[last accessed 14 May 2009]
Lambrecht, Bart M. (2005) Mergers and acquisitions as a response to economic
change Journal of Financial Transformation. Vol. 13. p. 73-76.
Nauss, Donald W. (1998) Chrysler to Merge With Daimler-Benz in $40-Billion Deal
(Internet) “L.A. Times” article available at:
http://articles.latimes.com/1998/may/07/news/mn-47240 [last accessed 14 May
2009]
Trautwein, F. (1990) Merger Motives and Merger Prescriptions Strategic
Management Journal. Vol. 11. No: 4. p. 283-295
8.3 Websites
Business Dictionary, URL: http://www.businessdictionary.com/ [last accessed 23
May 2009]
Hofstede Cultural Dimensions, URL: http://www.geert-hofstede.com/ [last
accessed 16 May 2009]
41
KPMG. (1999). Mergers and Acquisitions: Global Research Report 1999, URL:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/6821875/KPMG-MA [last accessed 31 March 2009]
Top Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) Deals - Institute of Mergers, Acquisitions and
Alliances (MANDA), URL: http://www.mandainstitute.org/en/statistics-top-m&a-
deals-transactions.htm [last accessed 28th April 2009]
8.4 Other sources
Dutta, Snajib (2003) Daimler-Chrysler Merger: A cultural Mismatch? (Internet)
ICFAI Centre for Management Research - ICMR Case collection. URL:
http://www.pdjwalter.com/FH-Ingolstadt/IPM-SS07/Daimler_-_Chrysler_Merger_-
_A_Cultural_Mismatch.pdf [last accessed 22 May 2009]
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) M&A integration survey report (2008) Speed of
integration improves M&A success. Survey report can be found in appendix 2
I9 Appendices
9.1 Appendix 1
Table 6: Perceiving and Managing the Impact of Cultural Diversity on Organisations (Adler, 1997, p. 105)
Type of Organisation Perception Strategy Most Likely Outcomes Frequency
What is the perceived
impact of cultural
diversity?
How should the impact of cultural
diversity on organisation be
managed?
What outcomes can managers expect with this
perception and strategy?
How common is each
of these perceptions
and strategies?
Parochial
Our way is the only way.
No impact:
Cultural diversity has no
impact on organisations.
Ignore differences:
Ignore the impact of cultural
diversity on organisations.
Problems:
Problems occur but they are not attributed to
cultural diversity.
Very common
Ethnocentric
Our way is the best way.
Negative impact:
Cultural diversity causes
problems for
organisations.
Minimise differences:
Minimise the source and impact
of cultural diversity on
organisations. If possible, select a
monocultural work force.
Some problems and few advantages:
Managers reduce problems by reducing
diversity; they ignore or eliminate the
advantages.
Common
Synergistic
Creative combinations of
our way and their way
may be the best way.
Potential negative and
positive impacts:
Cultural diversity
simultaneously leads to
problems and advantages
for organisations.
Manage differences:
Train managers and employees
to recognise cultural differences
and use them to create
advantages for the organisations.
Some problems and many advantages:
Managers recognise and realise the
advantages to the organisations from cultural
diversity. Some problems continue to occur
that need to be managed.
Uncommon
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The heart of the matter
Why do deals continue to 
fall short in creating real 
value? They don’t have 
to. The secret to success 
lies in the early planning 
and timely execution of 
integration tasks.
03The heart of the matter
While there may be many reasons for pursuing a merger or acquisition, 
it’s ultimately about creating long-term value for shareholders. That’s 
what doing business—and deals—is all about. 
Yet far too often real shareholder value is lost, not gained, after the 
paperwork has been signed and all the bankers and lawyers have 
gone home. Achieving financial and operational objectives post close 
continues to remain elusive. 
So why are deals continuing to under perform—even when management 
sets the right course with a solid strategy? 
According to findings from the PwC M&A Integration Survey Report 
2008, the early and timely execution of a few key—but fundamental—
integration initiatives are directly related to capturing deal value. The 
survey also reveals a close connection between completing integration 
activities during a critical window of opportunity—the first 100 days post 
close—and improved profitability, cash flow and productivity. 
Yet despite all the apparent benefits associated with early planning and 
rapid execution, many executives still report being comfortable taking 
their time when it comes to the work of integration.
Deals create opportunities to introduce leading practices and redefine 
business processes and cultures. They also provide the opportunity 
to boost performance by redesigning organizational structures and 
systems that otherwise might have remained the same if not for the 
deal. Deals comprise a sequence of prioritized, interrelated tasks. 
When organizations understand the interdependencies of integration 
initiatives—and speed up the execution of integration activities—they  
can stop leaving deal value on the table and start delivering greater  
return to shareholders.
The old adage “timing is everything” has never been more true than when 
it comes to executing a complex merger or acquisition. Done properly, 
deals can yield a higher shareholder value—perhaps much higher than 
you ever thought possible.
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An in-depth discussion
Deals under perform 
for some very specific 
reasons. It seems buying 
is easy, owning is hard.
05An in-depth discussion
In 2008, PricewaterhouseCoopers surveyed senior management from a 
sampling of large capital and middle market US companies which had 
completed a merger or acquisition in the past three years. Respondents 
had direct first-hand knowledge of the issues their organizations dealt 
with during the M&A integration. 
The goal of the study was to understand the current state of M&A 
integration practice and its impact on management’s assessment of  
deal success.
Among other findings, our survey results found higher levels of deal 
performance when certain integration tasks were started and completed 
within the first 100 days post close.
Our survey findings are summarized on the following pages.
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Our findings suggest that the time frame in which it is possible to 
make significant, positive changes is very short. The period from deal 
announcement through the first 100 days after closing the deal is 
particularly significant, because it is then that people are most open to 
new ways of thinking and working. It is essential to set the right course 
early during the transition, otherwise, attitudes may harden like concrete 
that sets before it has been poured.
Early integration planning—a window for change
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Figure 1. Deal performance is enhanced when key integration tasks are started and completed 
within the first 100 days post close
Deal 
performance
Time 100 days
post close
Delay
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X
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Finding #1—Strategic goals are easier to reach 
than financial and operational targets
Survey participants reported far greater success in reaching their 
strategic goals for a transaction than in achieving a deal’s financial  
and operational targets.
While 64% of respondents characterized recent deals as a significant 
success from a strategic standpoint, only 44% said they experienced 
significant success in achieving their post-deal financial goals. Even 
fewer, just 38%, experienced success in reaching their operational goals.
In some ways this finding is far from surprising. The strategic goals set 
for a deal may actually be easier to achieve than the longer-term financial 
and operational targets—and our survey results may simply be reflecting 
that reality. 
In fact, a deal’s strategic purpose is often realized by the mere fact that 
the transaction moves forward in the first place. Said another way: the 
strategy driving a deal gets satisfied when the deal itself gets done. 
It is the financial and operational goals, however, that remain the real 
challenge—which companies so often struggle to accomplish.
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Figure 2. Percentage who agree their most recent deal was a “significant success” strategically, 
financially and operationally 
Operational success
38%
Financial success
44%
Strategic success
64%
Source: PwC M&A Integration Survey Report 2008
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Finding #2—Buyers don’t always get what  
they ask for
The reasons for doing a deal often differ from the objectives 
actually achieved.
While buyers reported many reasons for undertaking a merger or 
acquisition, the two most commonly cited were growing market share 
and gaining access to new markets. 
64% of respondents said growth in market share was a “very important” 
objective, the highest of all objectives presented. Accessing new markets 
was the second highest ranked objective at 55%.
By comparison, the deal objectives respondents reported as actually 
having most “completely achieved” include gaining access to new:
products (79%)•	
technologies (77%)•	
markets (75%) •	
brands (71%)•	
distribution channels (71%)•	
In fact, of the two most common reasons given for doing the deal, only 
one of them—access to new markets—also made it into the top five 
objectives reported as being actually achieved.
These results are consistent with data presented in past surveys, and 
support the notion that companies frequently believe their deals are more 
successful strategically than they are financially or operationally. Buyers 
often gain access to new products, technologies, markets, brands and 
distribution channels simply by doing the deal. 
However, financial or operational goals—like growing market share, 
increasing profitability or cash flow, cutting operating expenses, and 
enhancing reputation—are harder to achieve.
In fact, reduction in operating expenses is the deal objective least 
achieved, at only 48%. Its poor showing is indicative of just how 
challenging it can be for newly combined companies to realize their 
desired synergies and capture deal value. 
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Figure 3. Percentage who report their objectives for undertaking the deal were “very important” 
compared to the percentage who believe these objectives were “completely achieved” 
Growth in market share
Access to new markets
Access to distribution channels
Access to new products
Reduction in operating expenses
Access to new brands
Access to new technologies
Access to management or technical talent
Enhanced reputation
Very important Completely achieved
56%
68%
77%
71%
48%
79%
71%
75%
56%
14%
17%
20%
22%
23%
33%
35%
55%
64%
Source: PwC M&A Integration Survey Report 2008
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Finding #3—Few succeed where they need  
to the most
Few organizations report highly favorable results in areas of  
critical performance.
Our survey findings reflect that companies are experiencing less than 
desirable results in many areas of critical post close performance. 
For example, only 36% of finance executives report “very favorable” 
results when it comes to improvement in profitability and cash flow 
following the deal. Favorable results were least likely to be achieved in 
the areas of employee retention, energy and enthusiasm, and morale 
(all at 23%), speed of decision making (21%), productivity (16%), and 
speed to market (14%).
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Figure 4. Percentage of finance executives reporting “very favorable” results in key  
performance areas  
Speed of decision making 21%
Productivity 16%
Customer focus 25%
Employee morale 23%
Employee energy and enthusiasm 23%
Employee retention 23%
Quality focus 25%
Employees’ clear understanding of company direction 30%
Cash flow 36%
Profitability 36%
Speed to market 14%
Source: PwC M&A Integration Survey Report 2008
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The first 100 days  
post close: speed  
drives success rates 
through early planning 
and timely execution.
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Finding #4—Faster integration in the first 100 days 
post close improves profitability and cash flow
While integration efforts often take 18 months or longer to fully complete, 
our survey results suggest a higher probability of capturing deal value 
when planning starts early and integration is executed rapidly. In fact, 
some of our findings show a relationship between completing certain 
key integration activities within the first 100 days post close and 
improvements in profitability, cash flow, productivity and other measures. 
The reported success rate for post-deal profitability and cash flow was 
sharply higher when integration activities were performed at a “faster 
than normal” pace than at a pace that was “slower than normal.”
A full 91% of survey respondents said they achieved “very favorable” 
or “somewhat favorable” profitability results if deal integration work was 
completed faster than their company’s typical pace of work, as compared 
to only 62% when work was completed at a slower than normal pace. 
Similarly, 82% of respondents said they achieved favorable cash flow 
results when the integration was faster than normal, as compared to 
66% when work was slower than normal. 
Moreover, profitability and cash flow results were also more favorable 
when the integration of operating policies was completed in the first  
100 days post close.
Forty-eight percent of respondents reported “very favorable” profitability 
and cash flow results when operating policies were integrated in three 
months or less, compared with just 33% (for profitability) and 37% 
(for cash flow) for those who took four to six months or more. When 
operating policies were integrated within the first 100 days post close 
both profitability and cash flow results improved.
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Figure 5. Percentage who agree profitability and cash flow were either “very favorable”  
or “somewhat favorable” based upon the overall pace of integration 
66%
82%
62%
 91%
Pace of integration
Profitability Cash flow
Faster than normal Slower than normal
Source: PwC M&A Integration Survey Report 2008
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Figure 6. Percentage who agree profitability and cash flow were “very favorable” based upon the 
pace of integration of operating policies
33%
48%
Profitability
Pace of integration of operating policies
3 months or less 4 to 6 months
48%
37%
Cash flow
Source: PwC M&A Integration Survey Report 2008
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Finding #5—Effective communication 
in the first 100 days post close improves  
employee productivity
Effective change communication delivered in the first 100 days post close 
positively impacts employee productivity, as well as employee energy, 
enthusiasm, and morale.
Respondents reported that productivity was greatly enhanced if 
employee communication objectives were achieved quickly. When these 
objectives were completed in three months or less, 31% reported “very 
favorable” productivity results, compared to just 7% who took four to six 
months to achieve their objectives or 9% who required even more time.
The same held true for boosts in employee morale and employee energy 
and enthusiasm. When the organization fulfilled its communication 
objectives within the first 100 days post close, 32% of respondents said 
they achieved very favorable results in both employee morale and energy 
and enthusiasm, compared to only 13% (for morale) and 20% (for energy 
and enthusiasm) who required four to six months, and 9% (for morale) 
and 17% (for energy and enthusiasm) who needed even more time. 
Similar results where reported in other key areas such as speed of 
decision making and employee understanding of company direction. 
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Figure 7. Percentage who agree deal results were “very favorable” in key performance areas 
based upon time in which employee communication objectives are met
Speed of decision making
Productivity
Customer focus
Employee morale
Employee energy and enthusiasm
Quality focus
Employees’ clear understanding of company direction 
Over 6 months
4 to 6 months
3 months or less
Over 6 months
4 to 6 months
3 months or less
Over 6 months
4 to 6 months
3 months or less
Over 6 months
4 to 6 months
3 months or less
Over 6 months
4 to 6 months
3 months or less
Over 6 months
4 to 6 months
3 months or less
Over 6 months
4 to 6 months
3 months or less
44%
37%
32%
32%
31%
31%
27%
29%
22%
20%
13%
24%
7%
18%
4%
17%
17%
9%
22%
9%
13%
Source: PwC M&A Integration Survey Report 2008
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Finding #6—Integrating operating policies in 
the first 100 days post close helps employees  
focus their efforts
Employees better understand how to focus their efforts when operating 
policies are integrated within the first 100 days post close.
Quickly integrating operating policies helps solidify an awareness of a 
company’s new direction which, in turn, better positions employees to 
help the company succeed by focusing their efforts on the things that 
matter most.
 
A full 83% of respondents said they achieved favorable results with 
regard to a “clear understanding of company direction” if the operating 
policies of the two organizations were integrated within three months or 
less post close. When the integration took four to six months or more, 
that figure dropped to 70%. 
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Figure 8. Percentage who agree employees better understood their company’s new direction 
based upon the time needed to achieve the integration of operating policies
4 to 6 months 70%
3 months or less 83%
Pace of integration of operating policies
Source: PwC M&A Integration Survey Report 2008
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Finding #7—Integration urgency remains low 
despite the apparent benefits of early planning 
and timely execution
Despite all the benefits associated with early planning and timely 
execution, most respondents report no sense of urgency to  
accelerate integration.
Perhaps the most surprising survey finding is that, despite the general 
lackluster performance reported by respondents and the clear benefits 
associated with early planning and fast execution, 69% of respondents 
believe their company’s integration work was handled at the “right pace.” 
And most said they wouldn’t have changed the speed of execution even 
if they had the opportunity. Only 25% admit they should have acted  
more quickly. 
A full 73% said their company operated at a normal or slower-than-normal 
pace during the post close integration, with only 27% of respondents 
reporting their organization accelerated its normal operating speed to 
complete deal integration. 
Just 18% of respondents reported they integrated their operating policies 
within the first 100 days post close. The majority, 82%, said it took their 
company four, six, eight or more months after close to integrate important 
operating policies.  
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Figure 9. Percentage who say their recent integration should have been completed “more quickly” 
compared to those who say it was done at the “right pace” or should have gone “more slowly”
Should have been done more slowly6%
Done at right pace69%
Should have been done more quickly25%
Figure 10. Percentage who say integration activities were executed at a “faster than normal”  
pace compared to a “normal” or “slower than normal” pace
Slower than normal pace23%
Normal pace
Faster than normal pace27%
50%
Figure 11. Length of time to integrate operating policies
7 months or more39%
4 to 6 months43%
3 months or less18%
Source: PwC M&A Integration Survey Report 2008
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IT integration and people 
issues remain the most  
difficult challenges.
25An in-depth discussion
Large-scale changes that are part and parcel of a merger or acquisition 
carry with them extensive opportunity costs: business may be disrupted 
and productivity can suffer as employees—confused about today’s 
priorities and tomorrow’s direction—spend inordinate amounts of time 
speculating about the future. 
A merger or acquisition provides a temporary window of opportunity for 
enhancing the organizational structure, redeploying people, redefining 
roles, streamlining business processes and improving IT systems and 
reporting tools. However, the ability to quickly bring together the right 
combination of people, processes and technology to achieve the  
synergies required for optimal value creation often proves elusive.
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Finding #8—Integrating information systems is 
often considered the biggest post close challenge
Overcoming the complexities inherent in the integration of information 
systems, operating procedures, business processes and management 
practices has proven to be a daunting, disruptive and overwhelming 
task for many. 
Our study reveals that over half of respondents—58%—say information 
systems integration issues prove to be a difficult integration challenge 
to resolve. And nearly half of respondents (45%) report that these 
challenges have directly contributed to “significant” or “moderate”  
delays in meeting the goals established for the deal. 
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Figure 12. Percentage who found integrating information systems to be difficult and those who 
say it resulted in delays to the overall integration
Resulting in significant or moderate delay 45%
Very or somewhat difficult integration issue
Integrating information systems
58%
Source: PwC M&A Integration Survey Report 2008
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Finding #9—Addressing people and cultural 
issues early is essential to capturing deal value
According to the PricewaterhouseCoopers 11th Annual CEO survey, 60% 
of US respondents reported cultural issues and conflicts as their greatest 
barrier to M&A success.
Larger companies tend to experience the biggest challenges from cultural 
issues and conflicting workforce expectations. This may be because they 
are more likely to engage in cross-border mergers and acquisitions than 
smaller companies. Additionally, key differences across regions were 
noted, with over half of US respondents (52%) placing more concern on 
the need to resolve conflicting workforce objectives during mergers and 
acquisitions than those from other parts of the world.
The CEO Survey also found that the broader “people agenda” was one 
of the top priorities for their organizations, with 58% of CEOs saying that 
it is one of their top priorities. However, much fewer—only 14%—report 
strongly agreeing that senior management spends adequate time on 
people issues during times of strategic change.
According to CEOs, some of the most critical barriers to success during 
periods of large-scale, transformational change cited include: 
Lack of engagement or motivation of middle managers to drive •	
change (50%)
Lack of change management skills and experience in senior •	
management (48%)
Lack of collaboration across functions to execute the change (45%)•	
Lack of communication on the personal benefits of the organizational •	
change (39%)
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Figure 13. Cultural issues are the biggest barrier to successful M&A
33%
42%
30%
43%
43%
36%
48%
52%
57%
60%
Unexpected costs
Cultural issues/conflicts
United StatesAll countries
Realizing the expected value of the transaction
Conflicting workforce objectives
Conflicting regulatory
requirements
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers’ 11th Annual Global CEO Survey, 2008
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What this means for your business
You could be losing deal 
value by failing to plan 
soon enough or act fast 
enough. Accelerating 
the transition improves 
results enterprise wide.
31What this means for your business
There is no value in a prolonged transition. If you’re not planning early 
enough and acting fast enough, you could be leaving value on the table. 
Delaying integration activities adds costs, slows growth, erodes profit  
and reduces or postpones the payback. 
When done properly, the value of a deal—and the opportunities it 
presents—may be much more than you think. 
Deals open a window to redefine processes, cultures and ways •	
of working.
Deals create possibilities to boost performance through sustainable •	
change and continuous process improvement efforts that could 
transform the entire business.
Deals can lay the groundwork for embedding enterprise agility, •	
preparing the company to respond more quickly and efficiently when 
new challenges—or opportunities—arise.
The basic principles to an Accelerated Transition™ are straightforward: 
improve your odds of achieving the right synergies and capture the 
desired deal value by ensuring a fast-paced integration using a 
disciplined process, well-coordinated launch, and relentless focus 
on the key value drivers behind the deal.
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PwC’s Seven Fundamental 
Tenets of Successful Integration
Capturing sustained economic value in a merger or 
acquisition is one of the most significant challenges 
for today’s growth-minded companies. As you 
might expect from PwC, we have a point of view 
about how our clients can best go about reaching 
their objectives. We believe there are Seven 
Fundamental Tenets to Successful Integration. 
Accelerate the transition. 1. 
There is no value in delay. It is critical to focus 
on obtaining bottom-line results as quickly as 
possible to maximize shareholder value. Prolonged 
transitions slow growth, diminish profits, destroy 
morale and productivity, and lead to missed 
opportunities and loss of market share. On the 
other hand, accelerated transitions result in 
more rapid return on deal investment, better 
capitalization on post-deal opportunities, and 
reduced organizational uncertainty.
Define the integration strategy.2. 
Integration is a highly tactical effort. But the 
tactics must be implemented in ways that  
capture and protect the value of the deal. Rapidly 
converting acquisition strategy into integration 
strategy is of paramount importance. Integration 
priorities are easier to identify and execute  
when a clear integration strategy is well defined 
and communicated.
Focus on priority initiatives.3. 
Resource work load limitations demand that 
integration efforts be prioritized. And shareholder 
value must drive the allocation of resources for 
meeting those priorities. First, potential sources of 
value capture and value creation must be identified. 
Then, resources are allocated based on potential 
financial impact, probability of success, and  
timeline requirements.
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Prepare for “Day One.” 4. 
Critical “Day One” tasks need to be identified 
early, before longer-term, more detailed planning 
commences. This allows for prompt identification 
of long-lead time items, well before they can turn 
into closing day surprises. A detailed plan should 
then be created, including all actions that will be put 
in place on Day One. Planning for Day One should 
begin in conjunction with the due diligence process.
Communicate with all stakeholders.5. 
Communicate early and often with all stakeholders, 
including customers, employees, investors, 
suppliers/vendors, and the general public—
providing information that addresses their special 
concerns, yet is consistent in overall theme and 
tone. Communication should articulate the reasons 
behind the deal, reveal timing for key actions, and 
be candid about both what is known and what 
is unknown. Feedback mechanisms should be 
included to ensure the dialogue is two-way.
Establish leadership at all levels. 6. 
Swift selection of key management posts early in 
the transition is critical for minimizing uncertainty, 
assigning accountability, defining functional 
authority, and establishing role clarity. Companies 
need to quickly define organization structure and 
operating model, and clarify key management roles 
and interrelationships. 
In addition, during the initial phase of integration, a 
team-based control structure should be established 
to link integration strategy and leadership with task-
level action, and to coordinate issue, action and 
dependency management across the organization. 
A successful integration management structure 
must define clear responsibilities and reporting 
relationships. Teams of functional specialists are 
tasked with integrating core functional areas. They, 
in turn, report to a team of individuals with overall 
responsibility for managing the integration. Finally, 
a steering committee of senior leaders provides 
oversight for the overall effort.
Manage the integration as a business process. 7. 
Mergers and acquisitions rarely fail due to flawed 
strategy. Rather, failure is most often a result of 
not executing the strategy in a timely fashion. 
Successful integration must happen quickly and 
systematically—the period of time between deal 
announcement and deal close, and the first 100 
days post close, are absolutely critical to realizing 
quick wins and preparing the company to maximize 
value over the long term.
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Methodology
In 2008, PricewaterhouseCoopers surveyed senior management from a 
sampling of large capital and middle market US companies which had 
completed a merger or acquisition in the past three years. The goal of the 
study was to understand the current state of M&A integration practice 
and its impact on management’s assessment of deal success.
We asked a third party survey company to conduct over 125 telephone 
interviews with these executives. Respondents participating in the survey 
were guaranteed anonymity for themselves and their companies, and 
were screened to ensure they had direct first-hand knowledge of the 
issues their organizations dealt with during the M&A integration.
Of the companies participating in this survey, 37% had $1 billion or 
more in annual revenue, 48% had $100 million to under $1 billion, and 
15% had under $100 million in revenue. Survey participants fell into the 
following broad industry groups:
technology, information, communications or entertainment (32%)•	
financial services or insurance (27%)•	
industrial products or services (19%)•	
consumer products or services, including retail (12%)•	
healthcare products or services (10%)•	
Sixty-two percent of interviewed respondents were senior executive 
management, with titles including CEO, President, COO and CFO, etc. 
The remaining 38% were comprised of other senior managers, with titles 
including VP of Corporate Development, Operations, Human Resources 
and Strategic Planning, Information Technology, etc.
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